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Introduction
Within England and Wales, it is well-known that a trust cannot be for a purpose
unless it is charitable.1 Yet this assertion is often caveated by the so-called
‘exceptions’ to the rule; one such exception is that of the Re Denley2 trust.
Though some have advocated that it should never have been permitted3, the
consensus seems to be that the Re Denley trust is yet another form of permissible
non-charitable purpose trust.
It has now been five decades since the High Court handed down its controversial
judgment in Re Denley and notwithstanding the controversy, the decision remains
‘good law’.4 Though perhaps tempting, it would be naïve to “[place it] on one side
in a pile…marked ‘not to be looked at again’”.5 And to simply dismiss the case as
sui generis would likewise trivialise the decision. Indeed, the case requires
revisiting not least because it appears to contravene orthodox trust law principles,
1Bowman v Secular Society Ltd [1917] AC 406 (HL), 441 (Lord Parker); Leahy v Attorney-
General for New South Wales [1959] AC 457 (PC (Aus)), 478-479 (Viscount Simonds).
2Re Denley’s Trust Deed [1969] 1 Ch 373 (Ch D).
3eg. W Swadling, ‘Orthodoxy’ in W Swadling (ed) The Quistclose Trust: Critical Essays
(Hart Publishing, 2004) p 29.
4‘good law’ in that it has not been overruled.
5Re King (Deceased) [1963] Ch 459 (CA), 483 (Lord Denning), the epigram referring a differ-
ent case.
1
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but also because the decision has been positively cited and relied upon in recent
caselaw.6 So returning to the decision 50 years later is more than just an
historically felicitous foray; it is an opportune moment to reconsider our
understanding of the fundamental rules and principles governing this area of the
law. It may, consequently, require us to reassess those cases which have taken Re
Denley as gospel.
This article will set out the law in relation to private purpose trusts within
England and Wales, and provide a much-needed, up to date critique on the current
state of the law. Concomitantly, it will re-examine Re Denley in light of these
considerations to establish to what extent, if any, its ostensible departure from the
orthodoxy can be justified. Finally, the article will go on to consider possible
recognised, alternate methods which could have been employed in Re Denley to
achieve the same ends, thus avoiding the creation of this novel, controversial type
of trust.
Re Denley’s Trust Deed
HH Martyn Co Ltd was a hugely successful company operating from the early
1900s until 1971, with its most prestigious projects including the gates for
London’s Marble Arch, architectural design and decoration work for the SS Queen
Mary, and providing parts for the Queen Elizabeth Hall, London.7 The
organisation initially began as a group of art craftsmen in the late 1800s but
evolved to become a limited company at the turn of 20th century, specialising in
stone, marble and wood carvings. It later diversified into, inter alia, joinery,
cabinet-making, wrought iron works and stained glass.8 The business continued to
expand and, in 1915, it extended its influence to the aviation sector, being
subcontracted to build aircraft. So prosperous was the company in fact, that by
1920 its Sunningend Works in Cheltenham was the largest employer in the area,
employing over 1,000 people.9 The most significant development however - legally
speaking at least - took place in 1936 when HH Martyn Co Ltd constructed a
trust deed; the latter part of this deed created a legal quandary, one which
6Gibbons v Smith [2020] EWHC 1727 (Ch); Grender v Dresden [2009] EWHC 214 (Ch);
[2009] WTLR 379. Re Merchant Navy Ratings Pension Fund [2015] EWHC 448 (Ch); [2015] Pens
LR 239 also cited the case but was more equivocal in its treatment.
7Grace’s Guide to British Industrial History, ‘H.H. Martyn’, at
<https://www.gracesguide.co.uk/H.H .Martyn > (accessed30August2020).
8J Whitaker, (The National Archives), ‘H.H. Martyn and Co. Ltd.’, at <https://discovery.na-
tionalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/5fb31548-ae73-482e-8590-20cf251f6ff4> (accessed 30 August 2020).
9Ibid.
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appeared to challenge conventional legal rules and principles - and it was this issue
which progressed to the High Court in the guise of Re Denley’s Trust Deed.
The contentious disposition required land to be given on trust to be maintained
and used as a sports ground – to be used primarily by employees of the company,
secondarily by any others the trustees would allow. Reginald Goff J chose not to
strike down the disposition but uphold it; in his opinion it was a valid trust which
was directly or indirectly for the benefit of ascertainable individuals.
Justice Goff’s decision was, and still remains, a controversial one but it is
nonetheless a decision still being relied upon today. To continue to accept the
trust’s legitimacy without subjecting it to proper scrutiny however, is to play a
dangerous game indeed. Its apparent departure from traditional trust law rules
and principles warrants a re-examination of the case; for as Rickett said
“[t]he ends pursued do not always justify apparent disregard for central
propositions in the law of trusts (without, at the very least, some
strong arguments).”10
Therefore, in order to determine the credibility of the Re Denley trust, it is
important to analyse it within its relevant, wider legal framework - that of the law
of private (non-charitable) purpose trusts.
Non-Charitable Purpose Trusts
Traditionally within England and Wales, non-charitable purpose trusts have been a
fly in the ointment that is the private trust; the general rule states such are
typically void.11 Roxburgh J in Re Astor’s Settlement Trusts12 explained
non-charitable purpose trusts may be declared void for two reasons: failure to
satisfy the beneficiary principle and uncertainty of the putative trust. Crucially
however, it has become apparent that private purpose trusts can fail for further
reasons, viz. for infringing the perpetuity rule; for capriciousness; and, on a more
practical level, for being administratively unworkable. The current state of the law
concerning each of these elements will now be considered.
10CEF Rickett, ‘Problems of Reasoning in the Law of Trusts’ (1978) 37(2) CLJ 219, 219.
11Cf. P Baxendale-Walker, Purpose Trusts, 2nd edn (Tottel Publishing, 2008) who argued the
converse.
12Re Astor’s Settlement Trusts [1952] Ch 534 (Ch); [1952] 1 All ER.
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1. The Beneficiary Principle
The beneficiary principle requires there to be beneficiaries who are able to enforce
the trust (and if need be, the court). As stated in Morice v Bishop of Durham13:
“There can be no trust, over the existence of which this Court will not
assume a control; for an uncontrollable power of disposition would be
ownership, and not a trust…There must be somebody, in whose favour
the court can decree performance.”14
As long-standing as this rule is, however, a different interpretation of the
beneficiary principle has been propounded in recent years. Hayton, for example, is
of the belief that, though there must be somebody able to enforce the trust, that
individual need not be a beneficiary/object.15 Indeed, why cannot the settlor of
the trust appoint someone – who does not have any interest in the property – to
act as a protector/enforcer of the trust? This novel view has gained popularity in
offshore jurisdictions, with some countries formally recognising such a mechanism
through specific statute.16
The enforcer approach however has departed noticeably from the established
view - that is, where the individuals able to enforce the trust are those with a
beneficial interest.17 Such a bifurcation, separating those with interests in the
property, from those able to enforce the trust, is unwarranted. As Matthews
argues, the right-duty relationship is central to the trust and to allow someone to
13Morice v Bishop of Durham 32 ER 656; (1804) 9 Ves Jr 399 (Ch). Matthews claims the rule
existed before even Morice: P Matthews, ‘The New Trust: Obligations Without Rights?’ in AJ
Oakley (ed), Trends in Contemporary Trust Law (Oxford University Press, 1997) p 2.
14Ibid Morice, 405 (Sir William Grant MR).
15DJ Hayton, ‘Developing the Obligation Characteristic of the Trust’ (2001) 117 LQR 96.
See also e.g. A Duckworth, ‘Star Trusts’ (2013) 19(2) Trust Trustees 215; Baxendale-Walker,
Purpose Trusts.
16eg. Bermuda Trusts (Special Provisions) Act 1989, ss 12A and 12B (inserted by the
Bermuda Trusts (Special Provisions) Amendment Act 1998); the Cayman Islands Special Trusts
(Alternative Regime) Law 1997. For a fascinating interjurisdictional focus on the enforcer princi-
ple and non-charitable purpose trusts, see generally L Smith, ‘Give the People What They Want?
The Onshoring of the Offshore’ (2018) 103 Iowa L Rev 2155.
17‘Beneficial interest’ more broadly conceived to include potential objects under a discre-
tionary trust whom arguably have the right to be considered, which, it has been said, is an in-
terest of sorts: JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlenniy Bank v Pugachev [2015] EWCA Civ 139
(CA), 13 (Lewison LJ). See also Gartside v IRC [1968] AC 553 (HL); Sainsbury v IRC [1970] Ch
712 (Ch).
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enforce without an interest would make the trust institution akin to a contract.18
Only those with beneficial interests are able to enforce the trust. Indeed, as Millett
LJ in the Court of Appeal in Armitage v Nurse19 made clear:
“there is an irreducible core of obligations owed by the trustees to the
beneficiaries and enforceable by them which is fundamental to the
concept of a trust. If the beneficiaries have no rights enforceable
against the trustees there are no trusts…”20
There are also pragmatic issues with the enforcer principle. In light of the
performance of their role, for instance, the adage “who watches the watchmen?”21
becomes apposite. Should the enforcer fail to perform their role effectively, or,
worse still, conspire with the trustee to steal the property, what then? To prevent
such happening the settlor would need to appoint an additional enforcer to oversee
the first enforcer, and so on ad infinitum.22 The chance of this occurring, though
perhaps unlikely, is still of course an unwelcome prospect; it is difficult to see how
the enforcer principle is an improvement on the current orthodox accountability
relationship.23
That said, it should be recognised the novel approach may provide greater
flexibility particularly for complex, commercial arrangements. Wealthy individuals
using the mechanism may move their property away from ‘traditional trust’
territories to that of enforcer-enabled jurisdictions, most likely for the purpose of
tax planning. And this, depending upon the reader’s point of view, may not
constitute ‘abuse’ or be cause for concern; Gardner, for example, views trusts as
merely facilitative devices, where the owner/settlor is entitled to maximal
autonomy such that “[if] he might wish to dispose of [his property] in some
18P Matthews, ‘From Obligation to Property, and Back Again?’ in DJ Hayton (ed), Extending
the Boundaries of Trusts and Similar Ring-fenced Funds (Kluwer Law International, 2002) 203, p
241; cf. JH Langbein, ‘The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts’ (1995) 105 Yale LJ 625.
19Armitage v Nurse [1998] Ch 241 (CA).
20Ibid 253.
21A variant translation of: quis custodiet ipsos custodes?
22C Webb and T Akkouh, Trusts Law, 5th edn (Palgrave, 2017) p 70. It also calls into ques-
tion the mandatory nature of the trustee’s duties if an enforcer were not to enforce such (KFK
Low, ‘Non-Charitable Purpose Trusts: the Missing Right to Forego Enforcement’ in RC Nolan,
KFK Low, and TH Wu (eds) Trusts and Modern Wealth Management (Cambridge University
Press 2018) 486, p 503).
23Indeed, as Low observed, the enforcer principle also presumes that the individual appointed
as enforcer is more reliable than the appointed trustee; why not appoint that person as trustee
instead? Or even as an additional trustee? (Ibid Low).
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elaborately arranged fashion, he should be able to do so”.24 And of course it should
also be remembered that orthodox trust law recognises the discretionary trust -
traditionally a popular vehicle for settlors wishing to do the very same thing:
minimise tax liability.
Significantly however, the enforcer principle produces (more) troublesome effects.
It enables settlors to shield assets from creditors - the settlor’s own creditors or the
trustee’s (it being trust property) and also the creditors of other parties, who may
not have any beneficial entitlement to the property.25 What is more, the enforcer
principle allows settlors to reserve extensive powers over the trust property (via the
enforcer26) and therefore create what is, in essence, a sham or ‘illusory’ trust.27
This should be avoided at all costs.
To permit the enforcer principle would be to substantially undermine centuries’
worth of caselaw and affect processes such as that concerning insolvency.
Additionally, it would be antithetical to the trust concept itself; the notion of such
being built upon the (admittedly woolly) concept of conscionability, with
‘conscience’ the “linchpin in the trust relationship”.28 To twist the rules to allow a
mechanism which would, in all likelihood, produce more inequitable outcomes for
innocent parties, would be markedly ironic. Though the trust has grown and
evolved since its embryonic days as the ‘use’ (and rightly so) we must be very wary
of allowing the equitable creature to evolve to such an extent that it takes on
characteristics hitherto unknown. We should certainly not cast off its heritage so
readily, lest it become a wholly different animal altogether. So it is that, to permit
anyone other than those with beneficial interests (or the court) to enforce, it would
not be a trust.
24S Gardner, An Introduction to the Law of Trusts, 3rd edn (Oxford University Press, 2011)
pp 31-32.
25B McFarlane and C Mitchell, Hayton and Mitchell: Text, Cases and Materials on the Law
of Trusts and Equitable Remedies, 14th edn (Sweet Maxwell, 2015) p 195. As pithily explained,
“[what this amounts to], in economic terms, is to create a fund of property that is unowned”
(Smith, ‘Give the People What They Want?’, 2170).
26This may be the settlor himself qua enforcer.
27McFarlane and Mitchell, Hayton and Mitchell, p 195. See JSC Mezhdunarodniy Promyshlen-
niy Bank v Pugachev [2017] EWHC 2426 (Ch) a recent example considering this issue.
28Matthews, ‘From Obligation to Property’, p 205.
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The Beneficiary Principle and Re Denley
Re Denley was not a case of orthodox understanding concerning the beneficiary
principle and the employees did not have a proprietary (or general beneficial)
interest. Reginald Goff J described the employees and “other persons” as
“ascertainable individuals” with legal standing to ensure adherence to terms of the
disposition; they had locus standi.
A comparison may be made here with that of Pettingall v Pettingall29 and Re
Thompson30 regarding individuals who are not ‘beneficiaries’ but nevertheless have
locus standi to ensure the trust is properly performed. Pettingall concerned a
bequest of £50 per year to be used for the upkeep of the testator’s favourite black
mare; the court upholding the gift on the basis the residuary legatee had locus
standi and could ensure adherence to the terms of the trust. Likewise, in Re
Thompson, a trust for the promotion of fox-hunting, the court granted a ‘Pettingall
order’ recognising the interested party (Trinity Hall, Cambridge) had the ability to
ensure compliance to the terms of the trust.31
However, with respect to Clauson J’s judgment in Re Thompson, the reasoning
was defective. By so effortlessly granting a Pettingall order, it effectively meant
the judge retrospectively validated an invalid purpose trust; as Penner candidly
explained: “On this basis any purpose trust of whatever kind could be enforced…It
is getting things absolutely the wrong way round to find that a purpose trust is
valid whenever one can devise a Pettingall order.”32 As such, it is therefore not
good authority.
In relation to Pettingall, it should be recalled that the later Court of Appeal
decision in Re Endacott33 declared such testamentary purpose trusts to be
“troublesome, anomalous and aberrant”34 and should not be extended.35 Re
29Pettingall v Pettingall (1842) 11 LJ Ch 176 (Ch).
30Re Thompson [1934] Ch 342 (Ch).
31Though some doubt the utility of Re Thompson following the enactment of the Hunting
Act 2004, the situation is more nuanced. Schedule 1 of the 2004 Act permits hunting but within
limited circumstances (eg. Sch 1, para 1(1) allowing poultrymen to stalk, flush out and kill foxes)
and so Watt persuasively argues that the Act does not in fact render this particular category of
purpose trust obsolete (G Watt, Trusts Equity, 8th edn (Oxford University Press, 2018) p 102).
Nevertheless, such purpose trusts would still be subject to the usual limitations and thus may fail
for policy reasons/capriciousness.
32JE Penner, The Law of Trusts, 11th edn (Oxford University Press, 2019) p 241.
33Re Endacott [1960] Ch 232 (CA).
34Ibid 251 (Harman LJ).
35Ibid 246 (Lord Evershed MR).
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Endacott is an authoritative decision and one which preceded Re Denley. The
notion that Re Denley, an inter vivos disposition not falling within any of the
accepted anomalous trust categories, could be justified on the grounds of Pettingall
therefore seems untenable. Furthermore, the facts of Pettingall saw that the
residuary legatee had a financial incentive; any money misapplied would diminish
the amount they would ultimately receive later. In Re Denley there was no
financial incentive or issue of fund dissipation, only the possibility of losing the
small amount of their own money which they paid so as to use the grounds
(twopence (2d.) per week). True though it is that a misuse of the land may have
decreased the value of the property, the likelihood of such happening was remote
(it being in the employees’ own interests not to damage/misuse their employer’s
land) and importantly, the benefit granted to the interested parties was the use of
the land, not its value.36 Notwithstanding both courts in these cases granting locus
standi enforceability, that is the extent of their similarity with Re Denley.
Moreover, regardless of the above distinctions, the locus standi notion itself is
inherently defective. McKay has explained that in such situations an interested
party, such as the residuary legatee, is not in truth incentivised to ensure the
purpose of the trust is performed at all; any funds given towards achieving the
purpose would come from the trust fund itself (as in Pettingall), and so it would
be in the residuary legatee’s interest to see that the purpose of the trust is not
performed.37 Furthermore, were the court to permit incentives or payments to be
made (whether or not from the trust fund itself) to third parties so as to ensure
performance of the trust, it would essentially be introducing the enforcer principle
via the back-door. Goff J was therefore wrong to recognise the employees in Re
Denley as having locus standi.
Another interpretation would be to view the disposition as a power. The general
rule prohibits trusts for purposes but it does not appear to preclude a power for a
purpose - the latter thought not to infringe the beneficiary principle. Indeed, some
are of the belief that Re Douglas38 is an example demonstrating this point.39 Yet,
for one to share such a view would in reality be a postulation as Re Douglas
involved a power to appoint property to institutions who would subsequently apply
36The value of the land would have also fluctuated during the period.
37L McKay, ‘Trusts for Purposes – Another View’ (1973) 37 Conv 420, 424.
38Re Douglas (1887) 35 Ch D 472 (CA).
39eg. D Hayton, ‘Overview’ in P Birks and A Pretto (eds), Breach of Trust (Hart Publishing,
2002) 379, p 382; PH Pettit, Equity and the Law of Trusts, 12th edn (Oxford University Press,
2012) p 63; Webb and Akkouh, Trusts Law, p 68.
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such to particular purposes; it was not a power for purposes simpliciter.40
Consequently, it would be remiss to treat the case as an authority proving the
point. And more obviously, were the disposition to be construed as a power, it
would be acting contrary to the established view as declared by the Court of
Appeal41 that “a valid power cannot be spelt out of an invalid trust”.42
2. Certainty
In addition to the beneficiary principle, the trust must also be sufficiently certain.
The trust in Morice - for “such objects of benevolence and liberality as the Bishop
of Durham in his own discretion shall most approve of” – failed for this reason. In
essence, this prerequisite requires the purpose and terms of the trust to be
sufficiently clear to provide the trustee (or the court) with sufficient guidance as to
how to perform the trust. Inevitably therefore, a lack of clarity as to the trust’s
purpose/terms will have a reflex action upon the disposition, casting doubt upon
the intention of the settlor.43
Certainty and Re Denley
Counsel for the defendants challenged some of the language used in the trust deed,
claiming such terms as “other persons” and “employees subscribing” were
uncertain. Goff J was nevertheless equipped to provide release, employing the
maxim certum est quod certum reddi potest as a tool to cut through the dragnet
cast by Mr Lightman and others.
Yet in providing liberation, His Justice failed to notice he cast a net of his own;
he explained the performance of the purpose must benefit individuals in a way
that was not too remote or indirect.44 But such a phrase is itself laden with
incertitude. Would it not have been too remote/indirect were the individuals never
40Penner, The Law of Trusts, pp 241-242; similar sentiments regarding Re Douglas are echoed
by Gardner, An Introduction, p 154.
41IRC v Broadway Cottages Trust [1955] Ch 20 (CA).
42Ibid 36 (Jenkins LJ).
43Similar to trusts for people: Mussoorie Bank v Raynor (1882) 7 App Cas 321 (PC (Ind)),
331. It should also be acknowledged that the settlor’s intention may be readily manipulated in
relation to this certainty requirement; a shrewd judge may choose to interpret the terms/purpose
in such a broad manner that the individual would not be treated as intending a purpose trust,
but rather construed as having intended an entirely different, and thus valid, disposition (See eg.
Re Andrew’s Trust [1905] 2 Ch 48 (Ch); Re Bowes [1896] 1 Ch 507 (Ch)).
44Re Denley [1969] 383.
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able to access the grounds during the restricted opening times? What if the ‘other
persons’ did not live in the Cheltenham or Gloucestershire area? Goff J chose to
evade such inquiries, curtly stating that “such cases can be considered if and when
they arise.”45 But surely the trustees’ ability to appoint any other persons they
wished would have been caught by remoteness/indirectness?
Perhaps the answer can be found in his pronouncing the trustee’s ability as a
power. But this reasoning is fallacious, for a sufficient level of certainty is still
required for powers; how else could we know whether or not they acted ultra vires?
And, as previously explained, there is currently no English authority which
validates powers for a purpose. This once again raises the bigger issue of the type
of disposition the settlor had intended, viz. if it really was a trust, what type of
trust was it?
Vinelott J in Re Grant’s Will Trusts46 claimed Re Denley was better seen
through the lens of orthodoxy, that it was to be viewed as a type of discretionary
trust.47 Indeed, from a distance this suggestion does bear an attractive mien; a
closer inspection, however, exposes its flaws. One such flaw is that it overlooks
Justice Goff’s choice of words to describe the employees; he referred to them as
“individuals”, purposefully avoiding the label ‘beneficiary’ or ‘object’, despite him
using these designations elsewhere in the judgment when construing the state of
the law. The proposition also misunderstands the nature of the arrangement; the
trustees did not have the discretion as to which of the employees could use the
property - that was determined by whichever employees paid the weekly
subscription. Yet one may retort the trustees did have a discretion but it was in
the form of how the property was used (being able to determine opening hours
etc), but this would not correspond with the orthodox understanding of
discretionary trusts, ie. trustees given the discretion to choose whichever people,
within a particular class, are to benefit. Perhaps most significant of all, were one
to paint the Re Denley trust a discretionary trust for people, it would expose it to
the prospect of all the individuals joining together and ending the trust, claiming
the property for themselves.48 This is clearly contrary to what the settlor intended.
45Ibid.
46Re Grant’s Will Trusts [1979] 3 All ER 359 (Ch); [1980] 1 WLR 360.
47Ibid 368 (Vinelott J).
48The rule in Saunders v Vautier 41 ER 482; (1841) 4 Beav 115 (Ch). Cf. McFarlane and
Mitchell, Hayton and Mitchell, p 176 – who state that were Re Denley to be viewed as giving
the ‘beneficiaries’ only a power to ensure the trust’s terms were adhered to, they would not have
a power to terminate the trust; that is, Re Denley could be seen as being an exception to the
established Saunders v Vautier rule.
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3. Perpetuities
Non-charitable purpose trusts must not infringe the common law rule against
perpetuities, viz. the rule against inalienability. This requires that the duration of
the trust not exceed the period of a stated ‘life or lives in being’ plus 21 years. The
‘life in being’ is understood to be that of a specified human being49 and, if there is
no ‘life in being’ mentioned, simply the maximum 21-year period applies.50 So far
so clear. Rather unhelpfully however, there are several decisions which are
noticeably jarring and it is to these cases we now turn.
Re Hooper51 concerned a trust for the care and upkeep of family graves but used
the rather imprecise phrase “so far as [the trustees] could legally do so”. The court
determined such to be a reference to the common law period and was therefore, in
its view, valid. Similarly, in Pirbright v Salwey52 the court deemed “so long as the
law…permitted” sufficient to satisfy the requirement. These are clear examples of
courts providing a benevolent construction to fulfil a testator’s wishes.53 To follow
such cases however would prove a very slippery slope regarding the
certainty/clarity of language required for such dispositions. For instance, what
would happen were a testator to provide for their animal “for as long a time as
rules allow”? Or “as far as custom tolerates”?
Sheridan posited, in light of these cases, that all private purpose trusts should
be treated as valid for the 21-year period.54 Though this could avoid (some)
interpretation issues, this would be to needlessly remove one of the core
prerequisites for purpose trusts; these trusts are already questionable deviations
from the norm - the conditions for such should remain resolute and not be diluted
any further. Moreover, on a practical level, it would need parliamentary
intervention to introduce statute enabling such a broad-brush approach to be
taken and this seems unlikely, at least anytime in the near future.55
49Rather than that of eg. an animal: Re Kelly [1932] IR 255. Yet, it should be noted the tes-
tator/settlor need not be related to the ‘life in being’ nor personally know them eg. a ‘royal lives
clause’.
50Re Hooper [1932] 1 Ch 38 (Ch).
51Ibid.
52Pirbright v Salwey [1896] WN 86.
53See also Mussett v Bingle [1876] WN 170.
54L Sheridan, ‘Trusts for Non-Charitable Purposes’ (1953) 17 Conv 46, 54-55 (though this
would not apply to those trusts specifically seeking validity in perpetuum eg. Re St Andrew’s
(Cheam) Lawn Tennis Club Trust [2012] EWHC 1040 (Ch); [2012] 1 WLR 3487).
55A recent review of the rules led to the Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 2009, but which
left unaffected the rules for non-charitable purpose trusts.
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Further deviations can be seen in the forms of Re Dean56 and Re Haines57. Re
Dean, a case now seen as dubious, saw the court accept a trust for the upkeep of
the testator’s horses and hounds for 50 years were they to live that long. Similarly,
in Re Haines, the High Court upheld a trust for the upkeep of a cat for its lifetime;
Danckwerts J having speciously reasoned that, consequent of the typical lifespan
for such an animal being approximately 16 years, it did not infringe the perpetuity
period.58 These two decisions are particularly difficult to justify, not least because
they were decisions of the lower court, but because of the lack of sufficient thought
given in either case.
In Re Dean, North J was certainly cognisant of the perpetuity requirement for
such trusts, warning that:
“The testator must be careful to limit the time for which [the trust] is
to last, because, as it is not a charitable trust, unless it is to come to
an end within the limits fixed by the Rule against Perpetuities, it
would be illegal.”59
Rather astonishingly, despite this apparent awareness, North J did not go on to
state if the trust had actually complied with the perpetuity rule. Furthermore, in
Re Haines, though addressing the perpetuity requirement, the judge employed
what was, in this author’s view, very questionable logic; upholding the trust
through reliance upon the average life expectancy for that particular animal only
leads to further confusion and distinctions. Courts do not discriminate as to the
type of animal which may benefit from these types of trusts.60 Upholding a
testator’s wish to provide for their pet cat, dog or horse is surely no different were
it for their hamster or snake - or that the testator was an apiarist; were a testator
to create a trust to look after his fledgling tortoise for instance, but fail to mention
a life/lives in being, and were the court to apply similar reasoning to Re Haines, it
would very likely breach the rule.
These frankly baffling deviations are not so much “occasions when Homer has
nodded”61 but rather occasions for which he was comatose. It is necessary to be
56Re Dean (1889) LR 41 Ch D 552 (Ch).
57Re Haines (1952) The Times, 7 November 1952.
58Ibid 11. Yet a quick internet search would find instances where these animals have outlived
that timeframe.
59Re Dean (1889), 557 (North J). Though more accurately it would be void rather than illegal.
60eg. a gift to feed sparrows: Attorney-General v Whorwood 27 ER 1188 (1750) 1 Ves Sen 534,
27 ER 1188 (Ch) (though the gift failed for infringing the perpetuity period).
61Re Endacott [1960] Ch 232, 250 (Harman LJ).
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aware of these specific instances - given the popularity of such purpose trusts62 -
but these cases are evidently aberrations and should not be relied upon. To borrow
the words of Nourse LJ: “Anomalies do not justify anomalous exceptions.”63 And
it would also seem that following more recent caselaw, ie. those decided since Re
Endacott, the courts are less willing to take such a generous approach regarding
the perpetuity rules.64
Perpetuities and Re Denley
Counsel for the defendants did not claim the perpetuity rules were an issue most
likely because of Clause 2’s apparent clear wording, specifying the period to be for
the lifetime of the last survivor of certain named individuals (alive on or born on
1st March 1936) i.e. lives in being, plus 21 years. That is to say it appeared to
satisfy the rule against perpetuities; Justice Goff appeared to have concluded this
to be the case too.65 However, his Justice did not elucidate as to which of the two
rules were applicable, whether it was the rule against the remoteness of vesting or
the rule against inalienability.
On behalf of the third defendant (the Hospital), Mr Lightman contended the
trust directly conferred a benefit upon a definite class of persons (the employees)
and had confined the trust to the perpetuity period66 - suggesting he perceived the
rule against the remoteness of vesting as the relevant rule.67 The timing of events
is important because the case preceded the Perpetuities and Accumulations Act
1964.68 Consequently, the provision would have been subject to the common law
rule, which dictated that the perpetuity period began from the date the trust
instrument took effect, viz. 11th August 1936, when the trust deed was executed.
Worth noting too is the unforgiving nature of the common law approach; generally
62See generally J Brown, ‘What are we to do with Testamentary Trusts of Imperfect Obliga-
tion?’ [2007] Conv 148.
63Said in the context of land as a donatio mortis causa: Sen v Headley [1991] Ch 425 (CA),
440 (Nourse LJ).
64Perhaps more so for sepulchral graves/monuments; s1 Parish Councils and Burial Authori-
ties (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1970 permits burial/local authorities to contractually agree to
maintain graves, monuments and memorials up to 99 years.
65Re Denley [1969] 386.
66Ibid 381.
67Or rather the most relevant rule, having earlier also stated (at 380) he believed there was a
valid purpose trust created too.
68Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1964, s 15, and the Act was not retrospective in effect.
Trust Law International (2020) 14
there was no ‘wait and see’ principle (unlike the 1964 Act69) so were there any
possibility, no matter how improbable, an interest might vest outside the period,
the trust was void ab initio.70 That is, it functioned on “the most pessimistic
possible computation of what might happen”71 – it applied “remorselessly”.72 Be
that as it may, on the premise it was the remoteness of vesting rule which was
applicable, the issue remains of in whom was the interest to vest: the employees or
the Hospital?
Mr Lightman stated (unsurprisingly) that, consequent of the gift-over, the land
was to vest in the Hospital - whether the trust for the employees ceased naturally
due to the effluxion of time or ended prematurely as a result of a forfeiture
clause.73 But context is crucial, for the trust deed was effectuated prior to the
introduction of the National Health Service (founded in 1948) and, being a
voluntary hospital, it would have been a charitable institution.74 This is
troublesome because where there was a gift to private persons with a gift-over to a
charity, the common law took the same approach, deeming the gift-over void if it
was possible (likelihood irrelevant) of vesting outside the perpetuity period.75
There was certainly a chance in this case that none of the forfeiture clauses would
be triggered to bring the trust to an untimely end. Indeed, even at the date the
case was heard, it would seem Goff J was of the belief none of the forfeiture clauses
had ever been triggered.76 So were the trust to naturally conclude upon cessation
of the specified period, a gift-over to the Hospital after such would have been void
for vesting outside the period. More importantly, closer scrutiny of the case would
in fact show that the Hospital was entitled to the land only if a forfeiture clause
were triggered, ending the trust prematurely; they were not entitled to the
property otherwise, and this was made clear through the specific language of
69Ibid ss 2-3.
70Re Watson’s Settlement Trusts [1959] 1 WLR 732 (Ch), 739 (Roxburgh J); S Bridge, E
Cooke, and M Dixon, Megarry Wade: The Law of Real Property, 9th edn (Sweet Maxwell,
2019), p 331.
71W Barton Leach, ‘Perpetuities Reform by Legislation: England’ (1957) 70 Harv L Rev.
1411, 1415 (emphasis added).
72Air Jamaica Ltd v Charlton [1999] 1 WLR 1399 (PC (Jam)), 1408F (Lord Millett).
73Re Denley [1969] 380.
74National Archives, ‘Hospital Records Database (Cheltenham General Hospital)’, at
<https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/hospitalrecords/details.asp?id=328> (accessed 30 Au-
gust 2020); GC Gosling, Payment and Philanthropy in British Healthcare, 1918-1948 (Manchester
University Press, 2017) p 59.
75Re Johnson’s Trusts (1866) LR 2 Eq 716 (Ch); Re Bushnell (Deceased) [1975] 1 WLR 1596
(Ch); Bridge, Cooke, and Dixon, Megarry Wade, pp 369-370.
76Re Denley [1969] 375.
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Clause 2(j) of the trust deed and echoed by Goff J himself.77 In light of the above,
the Hospital could not have been the party within which the interest was to vest.
It seems more likely the interest was to vest in the employees, but this is not
without its problems either. The harshness of the common law rule was such that
if it was possible an interest would not vest within the timeframe the gift was void
- even if it in fact did vest within the period.78 This could vitiate Re Denley; it
was only the employees paying weekly subscriptions who were to receive an interest
in the land, so it was possible none of the employees would pay the fee and equally
no secondary group of ‘other persons’ be appointed by the trustees.79 Accordingly,
though the chance of such happening was remote, there was nevertheless a
possibility no interest would vest within the timeframe. Re Denley would have
thus failed for infringing the rule against the remoteness of vesting.
Much to the chagrin of this author, Goff J did not address this particular (trust
for people) remark by Mr Lightman, but were he deemed to have acquiesced on
the point80 it would have nevertheless been a non sequitur. The rule against the
remoteness of vesting applies to all types of proprietary interest but, as his Justice
made clear, the employees did not have such an interest, only locus standi – thus
raising the question of why mention the rule at all if it did not apply? Not least of
course were he to have explicitly confirmed the application of the remoteness of
vesting rule (and ignored the infringement) he would have made - not so much a
mischief - but rather mincemeat of his own beneficiary principle argument, in
addition to adopting the erroneous view of it as a discretionary trust.81 It is
proposed ex hypothesi the rule against inalienability must have been applicable.
Goff J’s deafening silence on which rule applied was likely a deliberate choice on
his part; for him to have clarified which rule would have been to force his own
hand and effectively state within which of the two grounds Re Denley was to pitch
its tent. For the trust cannot be a tertium quid, with a foot in both camps. If it is
deemed therefore to have satisfied the perpetuity rules, it must have been the rule
against inalienability which was relevant, a rule still administered by the common
law. The consequence of this would be that the trust was, in effect, a
non-charitable purpose trust; one which, as explained above (see ‘1. The
77His Justice stating that the gift-over was simply “to cover the actual or de facto failure of
the trust” (at 391).
78Law Commission (Report No.251), The Rule against Perpetuities and Excessive Accumula-
tions (1998) 14.
79The judgment suggests no ‘other persons’ were in fact appointed by the trustees.
80He did allude to “the vested interest” when discussing a forfeiture clause (at 392).
81As explained above (see ‘2. Certainty and Re Denley’).
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Beneficiary Principle and Re Denley’) is distinguishable from Pettingall and other
testamentary purpose trusts, and flagrantly violates the Court of Appeal’s
definitive pronouncement - just several years earlier - that the categories were not
to be extended.82
4. Capriciousness
Capriciousness is not a principle of universal application which renders every type
of disposition invalid. Rather, it would seem that some dispositions, such as
legacies, are permitted regardless of caprice; it has been stated that “a testator
may dispose of his property as he wishes, however capriciously”.83 A distinction,
however, can be made where the disposition purports to establish a trust, as such
can fail for capriciousness (though, in truth, such has been a rare occurrence
within this jurisdiction).84 While the justification for the distinction is not entirely
clear85 it nevertheless becomes pertinent to ask what is meant by this nebulous
term. It would appear there are a few possibilities.
Perhaps the most well-known explanation of the term relates to instances where
the settlor’s (or testator’s) intentions are deemed arbitrary; where the terms of the
trust “negative any sensible intention on part of the settlor” such that the objects
would be “an accidental conglomeration of persons who have no discernible link
with the settlor”.86 Though this was said in the context of trusts/powers for people
rather than purposes, could not this explanation be adopted for purpose trusts too,
mutatis mutandis? It seems the answer would be no. Were a transplantation to
expect there to be absent a discernible link with the settlor, it would be
problematic; within purpose trusts, the object of the trust is the purpose, so this
82Re Endacott [1960] Ch 232 (CA), 246 (Lord Evershed MR).
83Nathan v Leonard [2003] 1 WLR 827 (Ch), 831 (Deputy High Court Judge John Martin
QC). See also Bird v Luckie (1850) 8 Hare 301 (Ch), 306 (Knight Bruce VC).
84Brown v Burdett (Declaration of Intestacy) (1882) 21 Ch D 667 (Ch) being the only clear
example. (Arguably Re Shaw [1957] 1 WLR 729 (Ch) should have also failed for capriciousness,
in addition to infringing the beneficiary principle).
85Glister and Lee state the distinction is based on fiduciary obligations being owed (in dis-
cretionary trusts and powers), with capricious terms rendering performance of their obligations
impossible (J Glister and J Lee, Hanbury Martin: Modern Equity, 20th edn (Sweet Maxwell,
2015) p 95. Yet, ex hypothesi non-fiduciary powers would not be able to fail for capriciousness.
Moreover, executors and administrators owe fiduciary obligations too, so this does not square
with capricious legacies being permitted; it also overlooks the fact that though the terms may be
capricious, trustees may still perform their duties sensibly.
86Re Manisty’s Settlement [1974] 1 Ch 17 (Ch), 27 (Templeman J); cf. R v District Auditor,
ex parte West Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council [1986] RVR 24; [2001] WTLR 785 (QBD).
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would mean determining whether or not there is a discernible link between the
purpose of the trust and the creator of the trust. In the context of testamentary
purpose trusts for example, this could prove somewhat farcical where, say, a
testator wishes to provide for the erection and maintenance of a monument for
someone other than himself - perhaps even someone unrelated.87 Such altruistic
instances as this would surely be deemed to lack a discernible link with the
testator, and thus be said to negative any sensible intention on his part; a truly
risible result.
In the context of purpose trusts therefore, it would be better for it to be limited
to the initial constituent, viz. where the purposes of the trust “negative any
sensible intention on part of the settlor”. This would appear a more pragmatic
approach but would still be, as Maitland would say, “a poor thing to call a
definition”.88 In addition, when it is examined more closely it can be seen as
merely an attempt to conceal the courts’ power to (still) strike down any trusts
which in their view they simply deem unworthy, without clear justification for the
decision. It is also inevitably hostage to the vagaries of whichever judge is hearing
the case; that which may be considered capricious by one, may not be so by
another (as shown in Re Hay’s ST 89). This does little for the surety and
predictability of the law. In fact, it is redolent of Selden’s well-known Chancellor
metaphor90 - but rather that this abstruse explanation of the term being
tantamount to a clog on his equitable foot.
A more nuanced meaning of ‘capriciousness’ has been suggested. Where the
purpose of a trust is to destroy or waste property, such will be deemed capricious,
causing the trust to fail.91 The 19th century case of Brown v Burdett92 is a clear
87As in Mussett [1876] WN 170 where a £300 bequest to erect a monument to the testator’s
wife’s first husband was not capricious and upheld.
88FW Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures, 2nd edn (revised by J Brunyate) (Cambridge
University Press, 1936) p 1.
89Disagreeing with Templeman J’s assessment in Manisty of “residents of Greater London”
being capricious, Megarry VC stated: “I do not think that the judge had in mind a case in which
the settlor was, for instance, a former chairman of the Greater London Council”: Re Hay’s Settle-
ment Trusts [1982] 1 WLR 202 (Ch), 212.
90F Pollock (ed), Table Talk of John Selden (Selden Society, 1927) p 43.
91M Pawlowski, ‘Testamentary Trusts and Capricious Testators’, Trusts Trustees 26(3) (2020)
222; P Matthews, ‘The Comparative Importance of the Rule in Saunders v Vautier ’ (2006) 122
LQR 266, 274-275.
92Brown (1882) 21 Ch D 667 (Ch). See also the Scottish cases of McCaig v University of Glas-
gow [1907] SC 231; McCaig’s Trustees v Kirk-Session of United Free Church of Lismore [1915] SC
426; Aitken v Aitken [1927] SC 374.
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example of this, where the testator had sought to provide a freehold house to
trustees on trust, with the purpose of blocking up almost all of the rooms in the
house for 20 years. Pawlowski states the raison d’être for this view of
capriciousness is that of public policy - to protect the economic interests of others.
In other words, a trust would be deemed capricious where the extreme
consumption/use of property is detrimental to the interests of those otherwise
entitled (and/or the community generally) - or where property with economic
value and utility is destroyed without good reason.93 This is important because the
decision of whether to enjoy the property, or destroy it, is no longer one for the
testator/settlor to make as the property would no longer belong to him; rather it is
a decision for those who would otherwise benefit e.g. residuary legatees.94 This
characterisation of capriciousness is more feasible, setting some much-needed metes
and bounds upon the meaning of the term, whilst concomitantly retaining some
flexibility.
Yet, there may be occasions where the purpose of the trust is not patently
harmful or wasteful as such but the terms are nevertheless problematic. For
example, what if there is incongruity between the purpose of the trust and the size
of the fund/property dedicated to achieving that purpose? That is, should the
amount dedicated to carrying out the purpose be considered exorbitant95 whether
it would cause the whole trust to fail for capriciousness, or whether it would be
partially upheld - the remainder on resulting trust. This author would argue it is
better to declare the entire trust void; were the trust to be upheld in part, it would
require the courts to exercise a considerable level of discretion - potentially
tantamount to guesswork – or, at best, require courts involvement and oversight of
the trust for possibly a long period of time, a timely, resource-heavy option. It
would be better the whole trust fail than either of these possibilities and we should
not ignore the crucial fact that this area of law needs clarity, not further
uncertainty.
Though it failed for uncertainty of purpose and infringing the beneficiary
principle, it is nonetheless useful to consider Re Endacott to illustrate the point
regarding exorbitance. Here, the testator had bequeathed £20,000 “for the purpose
of providing some useful memorial to myself”. This would be the modern-day
equivalent of a testator devoting more than £385,000 to achieve that end, an
amount which most would surely consider extortionate - save perhaps were it for a
93Pawlowski, ‘Testamentary Trusts’, 225.
94Matthews, ‘The Comparative Importance’, 274-275.
95cf. deficient: see ‘5. Administrative Workability’ below.
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particularly prominent figure.96 Had the testator used more definitive language,
such as “£20,000 to erect a monument in my memory”, could such have failed for
being capricious?97 In light of the more practicable meaning of the term
‘capriciousness’, it is quite likely; dedicating such a large sum to that particular
purpose could be deemed wasteful, being detrimental to the economic interests of
others.98
For a testamentary trust, this would be unnecessarily depriving, for a period of
time, whomever is otherwise entitled to that property.99 For an inter vivos trust,
the argument may prove problematic where, after the period of application, any
remainder of the fund is to return to the settlor. Yet, a broader argument could be
advanced. By allocating an excessive amount to the inter vivos purpose trust, the
settlor can be said to be keeping their wealth out of absolute ownership as well as
out of the open market - the settlor is therefore (albeit indirectly) affecting the
economic interests of others.100 Such scenarios of ‘excessiveness’ therefore, could be
said to fall within a broader understanding of ‘wastefulness’ thereby showing the
utility of this alternative understanding.
Rather unhelpfully, some attempts to clarify the law concerning the
capriciousness of trusts, though well-intentioned, have simply muddied the waters
further. For instance, in Re Manisty101 Templeman J referred to the hypothetical
example of “residents of Greater London”, and equated the term to the separate
96Cf. Trimmer v Danby (1856) 25 LJ Ch 424: a £1000 bequest, from the artist JMW Turner,
to erect a monument to himself in St Paul’s Cathedral was upheld (current monetary equivalent
approx. £100,000). But even then, prestige must have its limits; would it not be beyond the pale
were eg. a 160ft monument, costing over £4million, be built to honour an eminent individual’s
memory? (ie. the modern-day equivalent of the £46,000 it cost to build Nelson’s Column in the
1840s (HB Wheatley and P Cunningham, London Past and Present: Its History, Associations,
and Traditions, vol. 3 (Cambridge University Press, 1891) p 405).
97Arguably not infringing the beneficiary principle, being a recognised testamentary purpose
trust, but there may still be an issue regarding perpetuity (cf. the benevolent approach in Mus-
sett [1876] WN 170). Still, as Re Endacott shows, courts are not confined to failing trusts upon a
single ground.
98Not dissimilar to McCaig [1907] SC 231; McCaig’s Trustees [1915] SC 426.
99As in Brown (1882) 21 Ch D 667.
100Comparable to the rationale of the perpetuity rules, for which it has been said “stem from
the general policy of the law against the withdrawal of property from commerce” (JHC Morris
and W Barton Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities, 2nd edn (Stevens Sons Ltd, 1962) p 2;
echoed by CT Emery, ‘Do we need a Rule Against Perpetuities?’ [1994] 57(4) MLR 602, 603-
604).
101Manisty [1974] 1 Ch 17.
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concept of administrative workability.102 Emery, in his celebrated article did
likewise, believing the two terms to be synonymous, going as far to say that it was
“hardly necessary to invent a new vitiating factor – ‘capriciousness’ – where
essentially the vice is administrative unworkability and may properly be so
called”.103 Nevertheless, such opinions notwithstanding, the two terms are distinct
and should be treated thus, as will now be explored.
Capriciousness and Re Denley
With the trust’s particular purpose being evidently virtuous and the close
relationship of the primary category of persons to the settlor (employees), it is no
surprise to learn it did not fail on the common meaning of capriciousness.
Similarly, were we to use the alternate definition offered by Pawlowski - whether it
is wasteful or destructive - it is difficult to see how it could be deemed capricious.
Yet, one could make the argument that it was capricious as a result of
‘excessiveness’. Not only would it have meant unnecessarily/unfairly keeping the
property out of absolute ownership for a period of time, but if the number of
individuals who did actually use the property within that period were negligible
(or non-existent) it would have been detrimental to the economic interests of those
otherwise entitled – a fortiori considering the property was land, a scarce and
valuable resource.
However, this would, in truth, be a tenuous argument. Re Denley was an inter
vivos trust, so were the court to strike down the trust for capriciousness, the
property would have nonetheless returned to the settlor. This would not only have
defeated the settlor’s intentions but concomitantly destroyed any hopes the
interested parties, such as the Hospital, may have had of receiving the property.
That said, a failure of the inter vivos trust (unlike a testamentary one) would have
afforded the putative settlor another opportunity to rewrite any of the offending
language and try once more to effectuate their wishes.
102Ibid 29 (Templeman J).
103CT Emery, ‘The Most Hallowed Principle – Certainty of Beneficiaries of Trusts and Powers
of Appointment’ (1982) 98 LQR 551, 585.
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5. Administrative Workability
The principle that a private trust for persons can fail for being administratively
unworkable was made manifest in R v District Auditor, ex p. West Yorkshire
MCC 104, the only example within English law of a trust having failed for such.
The case concerned a local authority attempting to create a discretionary trust for
a list of purposes “for the benefit of any or all or some of the inhabitants of the
County of West Yorkshire”. Though the court concluded that it was not capricious
(according the traditional understanding of term) it did find that, to apply a fund
of £400,000 to several purposes benefiting a class of potentially 2.5 million people,
was administratively unworkable.105
Be it a trust for people or purposes, it is vital to extricate a reasonable
understanding of this ambiguous phrase. Some, such as Grbich, have stated
administrative unworkability to be synonymous with issues of certainty.106 Though
Grbich did not have the benefit of the District Auditor judgment - his article
having preceded the case - it is of course far from a useful explanation and
evidently contradicts Lord Wilberforce’s dictum in McPhail v Doulton107 that:
“There may be a third case [besides conceptual and evidential uncertainty] where
the meaning of the words used is clear but the definition of the beneficiaries is so
hopelessly wide as not to form ‘anything like a class’ so that the trust is
administratively unworkable or…cannot be executed”.108 And it would seem, since
McPhail, this ‘too wide a class’ explanation has become the shorthand for
administrative unworkability.
This ‘size of the class’ understanding, though useful in its brevity, nonetheless
amounts to reductio ad absurdum; it fails to explain precisely why having a large
class of individuals would make the trust administratively unworkable or unable to
be executed. Hardcastle, however, provides a definition which accords with his
Lordship’s view and goes some way to resolving that problem; he similarly equates
administrative unworkability with “impossibility of execution” rather than
certainty, because the “precision of a given description is a linguistic exercise which
104R v District Auditor, ex parte West Yorkshire Metropolitan County Council [1986] RVR 24;
[2001] WTLR 785 (QBD).
105Also declared void for not falling within any of the recognised ‘exceptions’ to the private
purpose trust rule.
106Y Grbich, ‘Baden: Awakening the Conceptually Moribund Trust’ (1974) 37 MLR 643;
Emery, ‘The Most Hallowed Principle’.
107McPhail v Doulton [1971] AC 424 (HL).
108Ibid 457 (Lord Wilberforce).
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must precede the application of that description to the facts”.109 He then goes on
to explain that a trust would be impossible to execute - administratively
unworkable - were a significant (ie. disproportionate) amount of the funds required
to be used by the trustees to identify the individuals within the class.110
This author would like to refine Hardcastle’s definition; to provide one that is
more specific and which would be equally applicable to both trusts for people and
trusts for purposes. This author proposes a trust may be considered
administratively unworkable (impossible to execute) as a result of
disproportionality specifically due to there being insufficient funds/property which,
consequently, prevent the trustees being able to carry out their duties effectively –
be it distributing among a class of objects or applying it for certain purposes. This
would rationalise why trusts for potentially large groups of individuals – such as
that in McPhail – will not necessarily fail for administrative unworkability and
would also justify the decision in the District Auditor case, which did fail for such.
Accordingly, this definition would mean that even a trust for a potentially small
class of individuals could fail for unworkability. Take, for example, the instance
where an impecunious testator leaves £10 on trust to be distributed equally
between his children and grandchildren; this trust would not fail for uncertainty
nor for capriciousness (given the testator’s penury) but would very likely be
impossible to execute given the paltry sum.111 While such scenarios would of
course be extremely unlikely and, given the amount of administrative work which
would inevitably be required to distribute such a small amount, failure of such
trusts would certainly be justified. It is therefore best to understand
administrative unworkability as based upon disproportionality but where
insufficient property/funds make it impossible for the trustees to perform their
duties effectively.
Administrative Workability and Re Denley
Should we apply the vague (and this author would contend, erroneous) ‘size of the
class’ understanding, there may be an argument the class of those able to benefit
from the trust would be so hopelessly wide to not form anything like a class –
particularly as the secondary group of ‘other persons’ was uncapped. But to take
109IM Hardcastle, ‘Administrative Unworkability – A Reassessment of an Abiding Problem’
[1990] Conv 24, 24.
110Ibid 25.
111It would also mean the concept would equally extend/apply to fixed trusts, not just discre-
tionary trusts.
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this approach would be to not only apply an unhelpful understanding of the term
but to also categorise the Re Denley trust as a trust for people; this would echo
the sentiments of Vinelott J in Re Grant’s WT112 which, for reasons stated
above113 is a flawed proposition. It would also not accord with the reality that,
when paying proper attention to the perpetuity rules, the trust in Re Denley was
akin to a non-charitable purpose trust. A more suitable definition needs to be
applied.
The preferred understanding, as argued above concerns that of
disproportionality, such being applicable for both trusts for people and for
purposes. It may be possible therefore that the property concerned could be
deemed disproportionate (insufficient) for achieving its particular purpose. Put
simply, the number of individuals to benefit from the use of the sports ground may
be so large as to vastly outnumber the ground’s capacity; the property would not
be sufficient for its purpose. This argument may appear far-fetched but it is in fact
quite plausible, as the reader will recall that the success of HH Martyn and Co Ltd
(the settlor) led to it at one point being the largest employer in the Cheltenham
area, with over 1,000 employees.114 Though we do not know the size of the
property, it is not unreasonable to think that had every employee sought to use the
sports ground (the subscription fee was only a nominal twopence (2d.) a week)
within the restricted opening times, the land would not have had sufficient
capacity – a fortiori there being any (uncapped) number of ‘other persons’ who
also could be permitted to use the grounds. Whilst it is true the trustees had a
discretion as to permit any ‘other persons’ to use the property, they did not have
any discretion regarding the employees; it was for any employees who paid the
weekly subscription. Moreover, the trust deed included a forfeiture clause - Clause
2(j) - which stipulated that should the number of employees subscribing and using
the land be less than 75 per cent of the total number of employees, the trust would
terminate and the property pass to the Hospital. It is therefore possible that at
one time the number of employees who would have been entitled to use the sports
ground may have been up to, or even over, 750 people. And though one may
parallel this situation with that of the trust in McPhail115 – a trust also benefitting
a potentially large number of employees, which did not fail for administrative
112Re Grant’s WT [1979] 3 All ER 359 (Ch), 370 (Vinelott J).
113See ‘2. Certainty and Re Denley’.
114Whitaker, ‘H.H.Martyn and Co. Ltd’; Grace’s Guide, ‘H.H. Martyn’.
115McPhail [1971] AC 424 (HL).
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unworkability – McPhail is distinguishable.116
One reply to this line of argument may be that such an outcome could be
avoided with the use of some form of booking system, allocating timeslots to
employees so as to avoid the grounds being potentially overwhelmed. This would
certainly go some way to assuaging the numbers issue but there is no record or
allusion of any such system within Re Denley, and it would also have needed to
have been in operation from the outset – the very beginning of the trust – to try
and prevent such a situation ever occurring. But still this would not have been a
panacea. The employees’ right to use the ground was conditional upon paying a
weekly subscription, failure to do so resulting in the revocation of that right.
Given the nature of this arrangement, it is certainly conceivable that a paying
employee would seek to use the grounds more than once (perhaps multiple times)
during the week for which they have paid - for them to have ‘value for money’ as it
were and seize the extraordinary opportunity. Consequently, were many employees
of the same mind, it could have meant the number of employees wishing to use the
sports ground during any one week may still be too large for the ground’s capacity,
even if a booking system was in operation. In short, the property would (still) be
insufficient for its purpose and the trust should therefore have failed, being
administratively unworkable.
Alternate Means?
It is clear that Justice Goff’s rationale for permitting this type of trust was
unfounded, and ignored and/or contravened central tenets of trust law.
Nevertheless, it is worth considering how the outcome of the case may have
otherwise been achieved – how the settlor’s wishes could have been fulfilled
through the use of other recognised and uncontroversial methods.
116Being a discretionary trust for people, the trustees therefore had the discretion as to select-
ing, from amongst/within a specified class of people, who was to benefit; the employees would
only be able to ‘enjoy’ the property after the decision had been made and exercised in their
favour.
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(i) In Possession of Property on behalf of Another
A general rule of property law is that where an employee is in possession of
property in the course of their employment, they hold such possession on behalf of
their employer.117 This would explain the lack of proprietary rights/interests and
why the trustees could appoint a secondary class of individuals to use the ground;
the employees were not solely entitled to use the land to the exclusion of others.
Yet, closer consideration of this approach shows its fragility. It would be a
considerable stretch to argue the employees were in the course of their employment
when in possession of the property; the use of the sports ground was not part and
parcel of the employees’ contract of employment, but a separate, additional
arrangement for any employee paying the weekly subscription. Moreover, there is a
practical issue: should there have been a period where no employees were paying
the subscription and using the grounds, how could it be suggested any employee(s)
were in possession of such on behalf of the company? This would have still been a
problem were those possessing the land only those considered to fall within the
‘other persons’ category, unless the trustees utilised their discretion and appointed
non-paying employees (but it seems no such appointments of ‘other persons’ were
made). Still, a broader point must be made. Even if the contract of employment
entitled employees to use of the sports ground, it would be only that – permitting
them use of the property –which is of course very different from granting them the
right to possess the land.
(ii) Contractual Licence118
A deceptively simple proposition is that the arrangement was a contractual licence.
It is very likely, if not certain, that for those employees who paid a weekly
subscription, it would have given rise to a contract – a contractual agreement
permitting them use of the land, upon continued payment. Again, this was not an
entitlement to possess; the arrangement was not a lease and were one to even
overlook the possession issue, to propose it created a lease would be wrong - not
least because other issues would arise, such as co-ownership, and identifying
precisely which of the parties undertook the role of lessor. Moreover, up until the
early 1980s119 the courts took a much more conservative view of leases: if it
seemed one party did not intend to give the other a lease, quite simply there would
117Parker v British Airways Board [1984] QB 1004 (CA), 1017 (Donaldson LJ).
118McKay briefly considered the idea of employees as licensees: ‘Trusts for Purposes’, 428.
119ie. pre-Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809 (HL).
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be no lease.120 Therefore, at most, it would be a licence.
Should the right to use the property be understood to have derived from a
contractual licence, it would mean the right was a personal one. So, were the
company to have given away the land in breach of contract, for instance, the
personal right of the employees generally would not have bound the recipient of
the property. This is clearly sensible and would have also assisted the employees,
helping them understand their rights – a personal right being much more
cognisable than that of the ambiguous and frankly unjustifiable notion of locus
standi (see ‘1. The Beneficiary Principle and Re Denley’ above). Within this
licensor-licensee relationship therefore, it would be appropriate to view the right of
the (paying) employees as not having the ability to compel performance of the
purpose per se, but simply the right to ensure their own use of the property. Put
simply, it would not be for the paying employees to be able to enforce the wider
purpose, so as to, for instance, prevent a non-paying employee (and who was not
appointed as an ‘other person’) from using the property. The (paying) employees’
rights were merely personal as against the company, not against third parties.
It would appear that a contractual licence is both a simple and convenient
explanation for describing the rights and relationship of the employees in relation
to the company. However, it should be realised that this would require the reader
to ignore the language and general tenor of the deed which had evidently sought to
effectuate a (type of) trust rather than a licence.
(iii) Bare Trust with Mandate/Agency
The most appropriate solution would therefore be to recognise a trust had been
created – but a trust different to that as construed by Justice Goff (and Justice
Vinelott in Re Grant). This could be that of a bare trust with mandate.121
Through this method, the company would have retained equitable title of the
property (hence employees having no equitable proprietary interest), with the
trustees simply holding the property to the order of the settlor. The trustees would
be nominees, agreeing to comply with the orders made by the company, including
any instructions contained within the deed.
120Errington v Errington Woods [1952] 1 KB 290 (CA), 298 (Denning LJ); Marchant v Char-
ters [1977] 1 WLR 1181 (CA); B McFarlane, The Structure of Property Law (Hart Publishing,
2008) p 510.
121Similar to that argued for the Quistclose trust: P Millett QC, ‘The Quistclose Trust:
Who Can Enforce It?’ (1985) 101 LQR 269. See also JE Penner, ‘Lord Millett’s Analysis’ in
Swadling’s Quistclose Trust: Critical Essays, pp 41-66.
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In this regard, there would be no issue concerning the beneficiary principle; the
beneficial ownership having remained with the settlor company throughout. It is
also clear from the language of the disposition that the settlor had intended to
create a trust; not just through the use of designations such as “trust” and
“trustees” but also granting trustees powers in relation to the property.
Not unreasonably though, one might argue that to provide such specific, detailed
instructions to the trustees for what they must do or permit concerning the
property would make it equivalent to a special trust rather than bare trust, but
this is not necessarily so. As Matthews has explained in his two-part treatise on
bare trusts, though bare trustees have limited duties, they can nevertheless have
significant powers; statute, for instance, makes clear that bare trustees of land have
all the powers of the beneficial owner of land.122 The language of the trust deed
appears to gel with this notion.
The disposition was also an inter vivos one which, in addition to HH Martyn
Co Ltd being a private limited company with separate legal personality123 would
mean it would have been unaffected by the death or departure of employees. It
would have also been undisturbed at the death or resignation of any of the
trustees; the mandate/agency relationship persisting with the remaining trustees,
also combined with the principle that a trust will not fail for want of a trustee.
Equally important, is that a nomineeship arrangement of this kind would prove
no problem in relation to the rules governing perpetuity, for such relationships do
not fall foul of the perpetuity rules.124 The question of whether the rule against
the remoteness of vesting or the rule against alienability was applicable would
therefore have been immaterial.
Whilst there is a possibility that administrative unworkability may prove a
sticking point - at least if this author’s proposed ‘insufficient property for achieving
the particular purpose’ definition125 were to be applied, it is not guaranteed that it
would prove so. What is more is that this method would not come unstuck upon
grounds of capriciousness; be it the common ‘lack of discernible link’
understanding, or the preferred wastefulness/destruction meaning of the term as
explained above.126
122Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996, s 6; P Matthews, ‘All about Bare
Trusts: Part 1’ [2005] 5 PCB 266; ‘All about Bare Trusts: Part 2’ [2005] 6 PCB. 336, 343.
123Salomon v Salomon Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL).
124P Matthews, ‘A Problem in the Construction of Gifts to Unincorporated Associations’
(1995) Conv 302, 303-304. See also Bowman [1917] AC 406 (HL).
125See ‘5. Administrative Workability’ above.
126See ‘4. Capriciousness’ above.
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Whether the courts would seek to apply the above five elements to a bare trust
of this nature is not entirely clear; were they to do so, however, the chances of the
trust failing upon any of these grounds appears very slim indeed. Equally
important, this bare trust with mandate analysis would not only correspond with
the language of the trust deed but also satisfy the intentions of the settlor – and
crucially it would do so without undermining or ignoring central trust law rules
and principles.
Conclusion
It is clear that Goff J’s reasoning in Re Denley cannot be justified and the trust, as
construed by His Justice, should never have been permitted. In his choosing to
recognise the trust as a novel one, and relying upon dicta from cases of dubious
relevance to do so127 Goff J made manifest the maxim ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. As Birks has astutely observed though: “[whenever this maxim] is in the
air, one knows that principles are being stretched and blind eyes turned to keep
some boat afloat”.128 This seems to be an accurate assessment of Re Denley. The
decision is particularly galling given the alternate legal means existing which would
have been equally capable of satisfying the settlor’s wishes - methods which
crucially do not contravene fundamental trust law principles. Yet, what is perhaps
most alarming is that recent decisions show judges are continuing to believe the
credibility of the judgment and the legitimacy of the Re Denley trust, readily
employing the device without deliberation. This is of course troubling and must be
addressed at the next available opportunity; for in truth it is not hard cases, but
simply bad ones, that make bad law.
127eg. Re Bowes (No. 1) [1896] 1 Ch 507 (Ch); Re Aberconway’s Settlement Trusts [1953] Ch
647 (CA).
128P Birks, ‘Retrieving Tied Money’ in Swadling’s Quistclose Trust: Critical Essays, p 122.
